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Abstract
The increased centrality of the European Parliament within the EU’s institutional structure has influenced the importance 
of voting behaviour within the Parliament. The concept of voting behaviour can be split into a variety of elements, one 
of which is parliamentary group cohesiveness. A consolidated stream of literature has treated the Euro-party groups as 
highly cohesive actors, influenced mainly by the classical left-right cleavage, with nationality playing a marginal role. 
However, other scholars suggest that the methods used to reach these findings are biased. Using an original and simple 
methodology, which transforms data from surveys to virtual votes, I build a simple model to test voting cohesiveness if 
the national element is a weak predictor of “vote”; even though this vote is dependent upon exogenous preferences and 
not mediated by party discipline. My results show that the oft-repeated claims about the single-dimensionality of the Eu-
ropean Parliament should be taken more carefully: national affiliation seems to play a greater role than the one usually 
envisaged by the mainstream literature.
Introduction 
and research question
In its sixty-year history the European Parliament (EP) 
has evolved from a mere consultative body into “one 
of the most powerful interstate assemblies in the West-
ern world” (Hix et al. 2006: 494). This increase of power 
makes it increasingly important to know how Members 
of the European Parliament (MEPs) vote. Contemporary 
studies on the EP can be classified into four interrelated 
areas from a broad viewpoint, according to the taxono-
my of contributions by Hix et al. (2003: 193):
1. general development and functioning of the EP, fo-
cusing especially on the institutional change provided 
by the entry into force of the new Treaties
2.  political behaviour of the citizens/voters and EP elections;
3.  the internal politics and organization of the EP;
4. inter-institutional bargaining between the Parlia-
ment, the Council and the Commission.
Focusing on the question of cohesiveness1 of the Euro-
pean Party Groups (EPGs) and the level of reliability of 
the mainstream measures of it in the light of a possible 
selection bias, this article falls under the third category. 
Thus, this article studies whether we reach insightful re-
sults on the internal dynamics of the EP by using MEPs’ 
survey data to compare exogenous preferences to re-
vealed legislative behaviour. In particular, does national 
affiliation play a greater role than the one usually en-
visaged by part of the literature? To answer this ques-
tions, the article analyses the most common measures 
of cohesion and presenting empirical results proceeds 
to the proposed methodology used to convert surveys 
into votes.
1 Although a slight theoretical distinction between 
cohesion and cohesiveness could be legitimately provided 
(“cohesion” refers to the characteristic per se of an actor of being 
cohesive, while “cohesiveness” implies that this actor is able to exert 
a force on its internal component, in order to act as an integrated 
and unitary system), here the two terms will be used as synonyms.
Party Groups in the European Parliament, Cohesiveness and 
MEPs’ Survey Data: New Evidence on Voting Behaviour
from a New (Simple) Methodology?
Interdisciplinary Political Studies
Vol.1, No. 2, November 2011
©IdPS
138
ISSN 2039-8573 online
Twenty years of studies 
on MEPs’ voting behaviour
The interest for the general question “how do MEPs 
vote?” attracted increasing academic attention since the 
early 1980s, in the aftermath of the first direct elections 
in 1979. In the 1990s the first quantitative and rigorous 
studies of voting behaviour in the EP were published 
(Attinà 1990; Raunio 1996). These studies were based 
on the only voting records available in the EP, namely 
the roll-call votes (RCVs). These were the votes which 
were officially recorded, in the form of minutes drafted 
by the Parliament’s offices. The records track how each 
MEP voted or abstained. Commonly, this voting pro-
cedure is called “public vote”, because a member of a 
parliament has no means of keeping the vote secret. In 
the American, British and in few other parliaments all 
the votes are roll-calls. However, in many other cases 
such as Italy, France, Germany, Belgium, Argentina, and 
Brazil some votes are public and recorded, while oth-
ers are secret (Hug 2006: 24-33). In the European Parlia-
ment the choice of the voting procedure is defined by 
articles 166 and 167 of the EP Rules of Procedure. Only 
certain votes are required to be taken by roll-call. How-
ever, a political group or at least 32 MEPs can request 
any vote to be taken by roll-call. In addition to RCVs, 
two other voting procedures are possible: the “raise of 
hands” and “voice” vote where it is recorded only if the 
bill passes or not, and another type of electronic vote 
that records the aggregate number of yea/nay, but no 
information about the single vote. The main findings 
of the first studies were two: EPGs show high cohesion 
and in the light of the RCV-based results the classical 
domestic political cleavages exist also in the EP.
In response to these studies, Carrubba and Gabel (1999) 
draw attention on the potential selection bias in using 
RCVs to study MEPs’ voting behaviour. On the one hand, 
it is impossible to empirically analyse the votes falling 
under the other voting procedures, because there are 
no records of those vote. However, RCVs are a small 
subset of the whole universe of votes cast (roughly 
¹⁄₃). Thus, only if RCVs represent a random sample of 
the whole universe of votes cast, then the causal infer-
ences based on RCVs can be generalized as a reflection 
of MEPs’ voting behaviour. If a dependent variable of a 
research (e.g. intra-party cohesion, inter-party compe-
tition) is related22 to the rationale behind the RCV re-
quest, endogeneity problems are expected to emerge. 
2 Either positively, negatively or both - but in a way such as 
the two effects do not cancel out each other.
In the light of this it may be assumed that RCVs are re-
quested by EPGs for strategic reasons.
In the light of the limitations of the RCV-based ap-
proaches, the literature splits into two very different 
streams, which proceed on parallel tracks, except for 
rare cases. On the one hand, we observe a straight-
forward continuation of the study of MEPs’ voting be-
haviour through RCVs. Hix (2001) was the first to apply 
Poole and Rosenthal’s method of creating spatial maps 
to the EP context. He did it first only for the 1999-2004 
Parliament, then together with Noury and Roland for 
all the legislatures since 1979—after processing all the 
RCVs held in the EP . The creation of a systematic data-
set seems functional to the spatial representation of the 
legislative dynamics of the EP. Many other papers have 
been published on the topic, all of them agreeing on 
some main findings. First, EPGs show high intra-party 
cohesion and inter-party competition. Second, vot-
ing patterns fall mainly along the traditional left-right 
cleavage, and only partially along an orthogonal pro/
anti-European continuum. Third, national affiliation is a 
weak predictor of vote; and consequently, the EP works 
surprisingly like most of domestic parliaments in West-
ern democracies (Kreppel 2002; Hix et al. 2005, 2006, 
2007; Hix and Noury 2009). The arguments advanced 
in order to justify the fact that their analysis is based on 
a subset of votes cast within the EP, are the following: 
RCVs and votes falling under a different voting proce-
dure do not vary in terms of importance; both are cast 
on the same policy issues; so, no issue is voted too of-
ten with a certain type of vote; and finally, all the EPGs 
are equally likely to request RCVs, so no group requests 
them disproportionally more than the others.
On the other hand, an increasing number of critical 
scholars (Carrubba et al. 2003, 2004, 2008, 2009; Thiem 
2006; Hug  2006, 2009) claim to have concrete evidence 
to confute those assumptions. First of all, according to 
them the majority of non-RCVs are cast on legislative 
voting (the most important votes), while most of the 
RCVs are cast on resolution and consultation votes (less 
important). Second, RCVs are cast disproportionally on 
specific issues. Finally, some EPG requests them more 
often than other groups. Consequently, inferences 
based on RCVs only, may be misleading and it seems 
necessary to look somewhere else to fully understand 
the dynamics of voting behaviour within the EP. Later, 
these authors rephrased their criticisms in clearer terms, 
pointing out not only the problems of endogeneity in 
party cohesion, but also the possibly misleading way 
scholars pooled data together to create the dataset 
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(Carrubba et al. 2003: 6-9). They no longer studied vot-
ing behaviour directly, but focused on the reasons why 
RCVs are requested. Some scholars have tried to pro-
vide an explanation to the real reasons behind a RCV 
request, relying mostly on theory, while others have 
applied methods based on game-theory to model this 
kind of situation. Thiem (2006: 17) considers the RCV re-
quests a consequence of high party cohesion. On the 
other hand, Carrubba et al. (2008: 570-572) see these 
requests as signalling strategies either for a group to 
highlight their pre-existing unity or another group’s co-
ordination failure. In other words, cohesion – or lack of 
it – increases the likelihood of a RCV request.
These two sides of the academic “battlefield”, however, 
are not completely detached from each other. First, the 
critics seem to increasingly talk to the other side, to 
point out their flaws. On the other hand, also the stud-
ies based on RCVs talk to the other side as they do not 
completely ignore that there is a substantial number 
of challenging arguments undermining the validity of 
their inferences. In most cases, the authors simply rec-
ognize the accomplishments of their critics, but then 
they present opposite arguments to justify their meth-
odological choice. Often some quick references to the 
major literature on the selection bias are mentioned. 
Second, some joint works have been developed by 
scholars usually supporting opposite viewpoints: for 
instance, Gabel et al. (2008: 19-20) built a visual repre-
sentation of the “behaviour space” of MEPs using both 
RCV and survey data. Preferences revealed through vot-
ing behaviour are shown in the x-axis of the graphic 
outcome, while preferences revealed through surveys 
are shown in the y-axis, showing that “parties play a role 
in shaping MEP behaviour”, but at the same time “MEP 
policy preferences exert a systematic effect on MEP leg-
islative behaviour even after controlling for party influ-
ences”.
Theoretical framework 
of party group cohesion in the EP
Why do we observe party cohesion in legislatures? 
From a very broad perspective, organizational strength 
and voting cohesion of legislative parties are explained 
by two types of institutions: external ones (the structure 
of relations between the parliament and the executive) 
and internal ones (the structure of incentives inside the 
legislature). The literature usually differentiates between 
parliamentary systems and presidential systems. In the 
former, legislative parties are usually more cohesive, be-
cause the executive is “fused” to a parliamentary major-
ity, and governments can reward loyal backbenchers 
with ministerial seats. In addition, as Diermeier and Fed-
dersen (1998: 611-621) point out, governing parties can 
call a vote-of-confidence motion, which confronts their 
parliamentarians with the risk of not being re-elected if 
the parliament is dissolved. In the presidential systems, 
by contrast, parties in government are less able to en-
force a strong party discipline amongst their supporters 
in the parliament: “loyalty to the party line is less impor-
tant, since lack of discipline does not threaten survival 
of the executive” (Hix et al. 2005: 212).
From the mere perspective of institutional functioning, 
the EU can be classified as a separated-powers system, 
where the Executive (the European Commission) does 
not require the direct support of a majority in the EP to 
govern. Moreover, the Commission cannot introduce a 
vote-of-confidence motion in the EP or dissolve it, call-
ing for new parliamentary elections. Despite this insti-
tutional structure, it is still reasonable to expect that the 
structure of incentives inside the legislature can lead to 
powerful legislative party organization: legislators who 
expect to have similar voting preferences on a range 
of future policy issues can reduce the transaction costs 
of coalition-formation by establishing a party organiza-
tion on the basis of a division-of-labour agreement3. On 
the other hand, the benefits associated to group mem-
bership also entail costs. In some cases, a party takes 
decisions that may be unpopular with specific con-
stituencies, or ideologically distant from a legislator’s 
preference space. In these situations, he/she may either 
vote against the party, to show his/her disappoint-
ment but with the associated risk of a political defeat, 
or may adhere to the official line and vote cohesively 
with the party group (Hix et al. 2005: 213-214). In other 
words, the exogenous preferences of each MEP appear 
shaped by both strategic and institutional factors (pri-
marily, party discipline) as they define legislators’ voting 
behaviour (see Figure 1). 
As theoretically defined above, cohesiveness is not the 
only relevant element of the EP party system, although 
it is the only one directly related to MEPs’ voting behav-
iour. To provide a comprehensive picture of the EPGs’ 
dynamics it is worth looking at the EP’s inclusiveness 
and systemness (Bardi 2011).
Since the very beginning party groups in the EP have 
been highly inclusive. In 1979 the three main EPGs were 
3 Party members provide labour and capital – such as 
information gathering and policy expertise – while leaders 
distribute committee and party offices.
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composed of deputies marked by a fairly differentiated 
national background: the People’s Party group included 
MEPs from seven member states; the Socialists from all 
and the Liberals from eight member states. This trend 
has remained consistent, despite the subsequent en-
largements of the EU. Neither the last “injection” of het-
erogeneity due to the Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 
2007 has substantially reduced EP inclusiveness. This 
proves the absorption potential of the EPGs in relation 
to the European dynamics.
Second, also systemness has remained high: the cur-
rent number of EPGs equals the number of EPGs in the 
parliament of 1979. The growing heterogeneity of po-
litical families inside the EP seems to have been over-
shadowed by a highly systemic environment4.
Measures of cohesion in the EP
A variety of indices of party cohesion are used in the 
EP literature. The “Index of voting likeness” (Rice 1925) 
represents one of the first attempts. It consists of the 
absolute difference between yes and no votes of the 
members of a party, divided by the sum of yes and no 
votes. The main asset of this index is represented by its 
simplicity, however, it presents the major shortcoming 
of not including abstentions in the calculation5. Attinà 
4 On the other hand, following the increase of EU 
membership, the number of EPGs formed by only one national party 
has fallen dramatically and completely disappeared as the creation 
of one-nation groups has been explicitly forbidden. A specific EP 
Rule of Procedure (Rule 30, “formation of political groups”) states that 
a political group shall consist of deputies from a specific number 
of member states. Following the 2004 and 2009 enlargements, the 
threshold is set to one-fourth of the member states.
5 Paradoxically then, in a party group where half of the 
deputies abstain and the other half votes yes (or no), this index 
(1990) proposed a slight modification of this index, in-
cluding abstention. However, Attinà’s index can result 
in a negative number, making it harder to use it for 
descriptive analysis and statistical purposes. Hix et al. 
(2005) introduced an “Agreement Index” (AI). It is calcu-
lated as follows:
where Yi denotes the number of Yes votes expressed 
by group i on a given vote, Ni the number of No votes 
and Ai the number of Abstain votes. As a result, the AI 
equals 1 when all the members of a party vote together 
and equals 0 when the members of a party are equally 
divided between all three of the voting options (vote in 
favour, vote against, and abstain).
 The scores of the AI give us a first impression of 
how cohesive the groups in the EP are. For the first four 
Parliaments (1979-1999), the cohesion scores are taken 
directly from Hix et al. (2005: 218). For the fifth and sixth 
legislature (1999-2009), the data are taken from Bardi 
(2011). With respect to the current legislature, the cohe-
sion scores are taken from the project www.votewatch.
eu6, chaired by Hix et al. and Priestley. Here, the cohesion 
scores are calculated using the RCVs held from July 2009 
to January 2011. The results are straightforward. The EPGs 
show very high cohesiveness starting from first EP legis-
latures. Looking at the current EP, many EPGs show very 
high cohesiveness (four groups’ AI score 0.9 or higher: 
S&D, European People’s Party, Liberals and Nordic Green 
would give the result 1, which is the highest level of cohesion 
possible.
6 This website is a public database of all recorded votes 
in the EP and contains useful information such as European 
election results, coalition trends, session attendance and group 
cohesiveness.
Figure 1. MEPs’ preference and behaviour, 
accordingto Gabel and Hix (2007).
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EP1 (79-84) EP2 (84-89) EP3 (89-94) EP4 (94-99) EP5 (99-04) EP6 (04-09) EP7 (09-14)
PES 0,76 0,87 0,9 0,9 0,9 0,91 0,94
EPP 0,9 0,93 0,91 0,9 0,87 0,88 0,93
ELDR 0,85 0,85 0,85 0,86 0,88 0,89 0,9
LEFT 0,81 0,87 0,86 0,8 0,8 0,85 0,84
GAUL 0,8 0,84 0,85 0,79 0,75 0,76 0,87
GRN - 0,81 0,85 0,91 0,92 0,91 0,96
CON 0,89 0,92 0,89 - - - -
RIGHT - 0,93 0,88 - - - -
ANTI - - 0,83 0,67 0,5 0,47 0,49
REG - - 0,87 0,91 - - -
IND 0,78 - - - 0,64 - -
NA 0,74 0,79 0,81 0,63 0,44 0,44 0,42
Average 0,82 0,87 0,86 0,82 0,74 0,76 0,79
Average (-NA) 0,83 0,88 0,87 0,84 0,78 0,81 0,85
Table 1. EPGs’ cohesiveness in RCVs, 1979-2009
Source: Hix et al. (2005), Bardi (2011), www.votewatch.eu. Party group labels: PES: Party of European Socialists (SOC, 
PES), then Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D, after 2009 elections to include the Italian PD, Partito 
Democratico). EPP: European People’s party - Christian Democrats & Conservatives (EPP, ED) and Italian Conservatives 
(FE), then EPP alone (after 2009 elections). ELDR: European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELD, ELDR groups), 
then Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, after 2004 elections). 
LEFT: Radical Left (COM, LU, EUL/NGL) and Italian Communists & allies (EUL). GAUL: Gaullists & allies (EPD, EDA, UFE, 
UEN), then European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR, after 2009 elections). GRN: Greens & allies (RBW(84), G, G/EFA). 
CON: British Conservatives & allies (ED). RIGHT: Extreme Right (ER). ANTI: Anti-Europeans (EN, I-EN, EDD, IND/DEM after 
2004 elections, then EFD after 2009 elections). REG: Regionalists & allies (RBW(89), ERA). IND: Independents (TCDI, TGI; 
group dismantled in October 2001). NA: Non-attached members.
Left), and all the groups show high cohesiveness (over 
0.8), with the only exception of the non-attached 
members and of the Eurosceptic group of Europe of 
Freedom and Democracy (EFD). From a diachronic 
perspective (1979-2009), all the groups increased 
their cohesiveness, with the exception of the Eu-
rosceptics, falling from 0.83 in 1989 to 0.49 in 2009. 
The AI scores are presented in Table 1.
The three main EP groups – Socialists, Christian Demo-
crats/People’s Party, and Liberals – present a relatively high 
level of cohesiveness starting from the first direct elec-
tion (respectively 0.76, 0.90, 0.58). Since the first election 
the trend has positively increased. Today, the three main 
EPGs score respectively 0.94, 0.93 and 0.90. If we look at 
the results of EP as a whole, the average cohesiveness 
score per group seems to have slightly decreased, from 
0.82 in 1979 to 0.79 in 2011. However, the result is heav-
ily influenced by the declining cohesiveness of the group 
of non-attached members. In the past, the threshold to 
form a group was lower, so the non-attached group was 
smaller and more “homogeneous”. In the current and past 
decade, the non-attached group has become bigger and 
politically more heterogeneous, even though it remained 
numerically dominated by far-right wing members. Thus, 
it is reasonable to expect its cohesiveness to decrease. 
Exclusion of the non-attached MEPs from the calculation 
(last row of table 1), shows how the average cohesion has 
slightly increased during the years (from 0.83 in 1979 to 
0.85 in 2011). In the light of these results, one may con-
clude that the EP has been increasingly marked by high 
cohesiveness of its constituent units. However, the advice 
of Carrubba et al (2009) prompts a question of whether 
the inferences based on RCVs are unbiased and generaliz-
able: do they accurately represent MEPs’ voting behaviour, 
in terms of cohesiveness? To answer this question, survey-
based MEPs’ preferences are analysed.
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A new (simple) methodology: 
from surveys to “virtual” votes. 
Surveys are a useful tool to explore the preferences of the 
members of elected assemblies. To date, each directly 
elected EP convocation has been surveyed by scholars; 
the first four by different research groups7, while the re-
maining three (V, VI, VII) were investigated by the European 
Parliament Research Group (EPRG), led by Farrell et al.. The 
survey includes personal questions, questions about the 
attitudes towards representation and general political at-
titudes, and on further EU institutional reform. The basic 
structure of the survey remained mainly unchanged dur-
ing the year, even though some questions were added and 
some methodological refinements were implemented. 
The percentage of respondents has increased overtime: in 
2000 only 192 MEPs participated to the survey, while in 
2010 the number of participating MEPs equalled 272 (Hix 
et al. 2011). The model presented in this paper is simple. 
First, I have developed an original dataset of virtual votes 
based on survey data—i.e. expressed preferences—and 
compared the results with real votes (RCVs) in the same 
time span. The rationale behind this model comes from 
Bardi (2011) and from Hix et al (2008). However, while the 
latter used survey data to build a visual representation of 
MEPs’ preferences, the original idea of this study is to trans-
form survey answers into virtual votes and use the same 
agreement index to compare RCVs and virtual votes. 
a. The data. To conduct the test, I have used the data from 
the 2010 MEPs’ survey. I have focused on question 6.4, as 
it captures MEPs’ attitudes towards different issues. These 
issues cover economic matters, social welfare, crime, and 
women’s rights. The question is presented as follows: “To 
what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?”, then the following eight statements are pro-
posed:
1. Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality 
of income.
2. Tougher action should be taken against criminals.
3. Government should play a greater role in managing 
the economy.
4. Current welfare spending should be maintained, 
even if it means raising taxes.
7 The 1979-84 Parliament was investigated with a survey 
prepared by Reif and Wildenman (Bardi, 1989; Westlake, 1994). In 
the 1984-89 parliament there was a survey conducted by Hrbek 
and Schweitzer (1989). In the 1989-94, the survey was organised 
by Bowler and Farrell (1993). In the 1994-99 parliament, Wessels 
led the research group on the MEPs, while doing a parallel study 
on members of national parliaments in 11 EU member states (Katz 
and Wessels, 1999; Schmitt and Thomassen 1999).
5. The use of marijuana should be decriminalised.
6. It is more important to reduce inflation than to re-
duce unemployment.
7. There should be fewer restrictions on immigration.
8. Women should be free to decide for themselves on 
abortion.
For each statement, the respondent is asked to give a 
grade, using the classical 5-point-scale (strongly agree, 
agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disa-
gree). I have transformed the answers to this question into 
“virtual” votes, as if there have been a bill proposing the 
content of the statement, for which each MEP can vote 
yes, no or abstain according to his preferences. To create 
this fictional dataset of votes I have used the following 
rule: if a MEP agrees with the statement (either strongly or 
not),I have input a Yes vote; if neither agrees nor disagrees, 
I have iput an Abstention vote; if disagrees or strongly dis-
agrees, I have input a No vote. However, as none of the 
statements of question 6.4 covers issues of European Inte-
gration, I have included another question from the survey. 
The question added to my dataset is question 6.5: “Where 
would you place yourself on the question of the European 
Integration?” In this case, the answer option was opera-
tionalized as an 11-point-scale, which ranges from 0 (Eu-
ropean Integration has gone too far) to 10 (the EU should 
become a federal state immediately). The scale is recoded 
as follows: values from 0 to 4—No votes (towards further 
European Integration); value 5—an abstention; and, val-
ues from 6 to 10—Yes votes. For each participating MEP I 
have created nine virtual votes, one for each issue. Virtually 
it represents a dataset of 272 MEPs voting nine times on 
different issues, resulting in 2448 “virtual votes”.
Before proceeding, a further methodological clarification 
is needed. Since one of the main problems of looking sole-
ly at RCVs is the fact that this sample is non-representative, 
and one may argue that the proposed method does not 
produce substantial quantitative improvements over the 
selection bias problem. This may be true, however, with 
a crucial qualitative difference. If on the one hand, the 
problem of RCVs is that there is a correlation between the 
type of vote and party cohesiveness, on the other hand 
this does not hold when it comes to survey data. In other 
words, one can expect MEPs to shift from their ideal vote 
in order to comply with party line; but there is no such cor-
relation when a MEP is expressing his/her opinion in an 
anonymous survey. The original dataset is incomplete, but 
it does not suffer from endogeneity problems.
b. The results. I have applied the Agreement Index to the 
new “virtual votes” and compared it to the results available 
in the literature. In particular, I have conducted two kinds 
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of comparisons: 1. Survey-based EPG cohesion compared 
to survey-based cohesion by national affiliation; 2. RCV-
based EPG cohesion compared to survey-based EPG co-
hesion. First, I have calculated the degree of cohesion by 
European Party group and national affiliation. If, as Gabel 
and Hix (2007) state, the ideological dimension of the EP is 
more relevant than the national affiliation of MEPs, I should 
expect this index to be higher for the grouping by EPG 
than by nationality. It is worth stressing that preferences 
are under discussion, while the aforementioned scholars 
refer to RCV. However, the same authors also claim that 
the EP is a politically homogeneous environment. In this 
respect, if  preferences by EPG are compared to prefer-
ences by nationality, former should be expected to play a 
more important role.
Second, I have looked at the degree of absolute cohesion 
by groups, for both RCVs survey-based data, which pre-
sent more complex picture. It would not be reasonable 
to expect cohesion “by preference” to match exactly co-
hesion “by RCVs”, given the direct impact of other factors. 
Worth noting is also that the results from the original data-
set must not necessarily match the results in non-RCVs. 
In other words, these results do not have the ambition to 
represent a perfect proxy of the universe of all the votes 
held in the EP. Yet, according to the mainstream literature, 
EPGs are considered politically homogeneous groups (Hix 
2002), thus, this homogeneity is expected to be primarily 
a consequence of common preferences, while strength-
ened by party discipline. However, the results shown in 
Table 2 and Figure 2 seem to tell a different story.
Table 2. Cohesion scores (AI) for the nine EPGs for each question converted into votes. 
The asterisk marks those groups with few observations (<10).
Source: author’s own compilation
Figure 2. Visual representation of the comparison between cohesion scores (AI) of RCVs and the average cohesion of 
virtual votes obtained through the transformation of survey data (2010 MEPs’ survey)
Source: author’s own compilation
Inequal. Crime Econ. Welfare Marijua. Inflation Immigr. Abortion Pro-EU Average
ALDE 0,46 0,79 0,25 0,25 0,41 0,11 0,25 0,90 0,94 0,48
ECR 0,33 0,92 0,33 0,63 0,80 0,33 0,80 0,33 0,63 0,57
EFD 0,25 1,00 0,25 0,25 0,67 0,50 0,94 0,25 0,67 0,53
EPP-ED 0,47 0,84 0,10 0,16 0,84 0,37 0,37 0,32 0,79 0,47
Greens-EFA 0,96 0,33 0,72 0,86 0,63 0,72 0,80 0,92 0,86 0,76
GUE-NGL* 1,00 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,83 1,00 0,50 1,00 0,50 0,81
N-A* 0,25 0,67 0,25 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,57
PES (S&D) 0,94 0,54 0,77 0,88 0,36 0,83 0,46 0,93 0,86 0,73
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The EPGs would appear much less cohesive, if their mem-
bers were to vote according to the preference revealed in 
the survey. The only outliers appear to be the non-attached 
MEPs and the group Europe of Freedom and Democracy. In 
particular, the analysis of the three main groups reveals that 
the scores of the Socialists differ the least. This may be a con-
sequence of Socialists’ higher ideological homogeneity. Thus, 
Socialist MEPs may be expected to display more similar indi-
vidual preferences if compared to the other two main groups.
In the cases of the European People’s Party and the Liber-
als the difference is striking: 0.47 rather than 0.93 and 0.48 
rather than 0.90 respectively, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Comparison between cohesion scores (AI) of RCVs and the average cohesion of  virtual votes obtained through 
the transformation of survey data (2010 MEPs’ survey).  EPGs that show the highest discrepancyhighlighted in bold.  The 
asterisk marks those groups with few observations (<10). Source: author’s own compilation. 
Disaggregating the average scores for each question 
of the survey, shows on which issue the groups appear 
less internally coherent. Considering the questions: “how 
much the State should regulate the economy”, and if “wel-
fare spending should be maintained even if by means of 
raising taxes” shows that the EPP’s values denote very high 
internal division: 0.10 and 0.16. Low cohesiveness can be 
found also regarding abortion, inflation and immigration. 
The Liberals, on the other hand, are mostly divided on in-
flation (0.11) and state regulation of the economy, welfare 
spending, and inflation (both scoring 0.25). However, they 
look highly cohesive on abortion. The Socialists show low 
cohesiveness only on the question on marijuana and de-
criminalization (0.36). All these elements contribute to de-
fine a different picture from the one provided by the main-
stream literature on the dimension of EP politics (Hix 2002; 
Hix et al 2003; Hix et al 2005; 2006; 2007). Unlike the main-
stream literature, my findings suggest that despite being 
part of the same parliamentary group, MEPs from different 
member states show different attitudes towards these is-
sues (as defined by their preferences). If they were to vote 
according to these preferences they would be members 
of a strongly divided group. One may expect that the co-
hesion index calculated by national affiliation to be on av-
erage lower than the one calculated by EPG, given the lack 
of a national “whip”. However, the data presented in Table 4 
show some noticeable results.
On average, cohesiveness by member state is not as 
low as expected. Ccomparison of these results with the 
ones in the previous table shows that the majority of the 
states have shown higher cohesiveness than the major-
ity of EPGs. In absolute terms, cohesiveness by national 
affiliation ranges from 0.43 (Poland) and 0.47 (Germany) 
to 0.83 (Portugal), the most cohesive country in the 
sample8. Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Romania, 
and Spain score higher than 0.70. On the other hand, 
only the Socialists, the Greens/European Free Alliance 
and the United European Left/Nordic Green Left show a 
level of cohesiveness higher than 0.70. All the countries 
show higher scores than the People’s Party, Liberals, 
ECR and EFD, with the only exceptions of Germany and 
Poland. In the light of these results, we can claim that if 
they were to vote according to their preferences, MEPs 
would vote more cohesively based on nationality than 
on ideological terms.
These results seem to define a picture that is pretty 
distant from the mainstream claim that “the European 
Parliament is surprisingly like all other democratic par-
liaments”, where votes fall along the left-right political 
cleavage, and “national affiliation is a weak predictor of 
how MEPs vote” (Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006, p. 509). 
8 In Portugal (one asterisk in the table) only few 
MEPs participated to the survey, and one may think that this 
cohesiveness is a random product of too few observations. But 
many other countries, with a higher number of observations, show 
high cohesiveness too.
 Inequal. Crime Econ. Welfare Marijua. Inflation Immigr. Abortion Pro-EU Average 
ALDE 0,46 0,79 0,25 0,25 0,41 0,11 0,25 0,90 0,94 0,48 
ECR 0,33 0,92 0,33 0,63 0,80 0,33 0,80 0,33 0,63 0,57 
EFD 0,25 1,00 0,25 0,25 0,67 0,50 0,94 0,25 0,67 0,53 
EPP-ED 0,47 0,84 0,10 0,16 0,84 0,37 0,37 0,32 0,79 0,47 
Greens-EFA 0,96 0,33 0,72 0,86 0,63 0,72 0,80 0,92 0,86 0,76 
GUE-NGL* 1,00 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,83 1,00 0,50 1,00 0,50 0,81 
N-A* 0,25 0,67 0,25 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,67 0,57 
PES (S&D) 0,94 0,54 0,77 0,88 0,36 0,83 0,46 0,93 0,86 0,73 
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More closer consideration shows that many northern Eu-
ropean countries, with consolidated tradition of human 
rights protection (Sweden, Denmark, Belgium) score 1 
when it comes to the question on abortion. This means 
that all the MEPs from these countries “vote” united. On the 
contrary, in Poland, where abortion is one of the most con-
troversial political issues, MEPs appear divided. The same 
holds true when it comes to the Italian delegation, scoring 
0.30. Interestingly, Belgian MEPs express similar preferenc-
es (AI=1) on the question of European Integration, while 
the most divided countries on this issue are traditionally 
Eurosceptic Sweden, Finland and especially the UK. 
Conclusions and perspectives 
on further research.
The EP has evolved from a “multi-lingual talking shop” 
(Farrell, Hix, Johnson and Scully, 2006, p. 3) to one of 
the most powerful interstate assemblies in the world. 
In this respect, it becomes crucial to, understand how 
Table 4. Cohesiveness scores (AI) by member State. The asterisk marks those states for which there are few observations 
(<10): the double asterisk those with too few observations (<5), so they were treated as missing values.
Inequal. Crime Econ. Welfare Marijua. Inflation Immigr. Abort. Pro-EU Average
Austria* 0,83 0,50 0,83 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,50 0,57
Belgium 0,88 0,88 1,00 0,67 0,25 0,67 0,25 1,00 1,00 0,73
Bulgaria 0,33 0,92 0,92 0,63 0,92 0,63 0,33 1,00 0,92 0,73
Cyprus**  - - - - - - - - - -
Czech Republic* 0,25 0,88 0,25 0,67 0,67 0,88 0,25 0,67 0,67 0,57
Denmark 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,33 0,63 1,00 0,63 0,63
Estonia**  - - - - - - - -  - -
Finland 1,00 0,67 0,88 0,88 0,25 0,67 0,88 0,88 0,25 0,70
France 0,89 0,81 0,71 0,58 0,13 0,89 0,40 0,95 0,95 0,70
Germany 0,38 0,50 0,21 0,21 0,50 0,38 0,50 0,68 0,91 0,47
Greece* 1,00 0,75 0,75 1,00 0,00 0,75 0,75 1,00 0,00 0,67
Hungary* 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,00 0,00 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,58
Ireland 0,92 0,80 0,63 0,63 0,63 0,80 0,33 0,33 0,50 0,62
Italy 0,81 0,89 0,41 0,50 0,68 0,70 0,35 0,30 0,61 0,58
Latvia**  - - - - - - - - - -
Lithuania** - - - - - - - - -  -
Luxembourg**  - - - - - - - - - -
Malta** - - - - - - - - -  -
Netherlands 0,67 0,67 0,25 0,67 0,88 0,67 0,67 0,88 0,67 0,67
Poland 0,30 0,83 0,50 0,30 0,75 0,30 0,00 0,00 0,90 0,43
Portugal* 1,00 0,83 0,50 0,83 0,50 1,00 1,00 0,83 1,00 0,83
Romania 0,71 0,89 0,40 0,58 0,81 0,40 0,71 0,89 0,95 0,71
Slovakia**  - - - - - - - - - -
Slovenia** - - - - - - - - - -
Spain 0,92 0,63 0,92 0,80 0,33 0,63 0,33 0,80 0,92 0,70
Sweden 0,80 0,33 0,33 0,80 0,92 0,33 0,92 1,00 0,33 0,64
UK 0,58 0,89 0,40 0,58 0,40 0,40 0,58 0,58 0,58 0,56
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its members vote and to address its internal dynamics, 
such as cohesiveness of its political groups. A part of 
the literature envisages a high EPGs cohesiveness, with 
voting behaviour consistently falling along ideological 
lines, and considers national affiliation as a marginal fac-
tor in terms of influence exerted on the way MEPs vote. 
Consistently with the critical literature claiming that the 
inferences based on RCVs only may be misleading, I have 
developed a simple model to inductively understand 
how MEPs would vote, if they could follow their exoge-
nous preferences. The analyses are based on a dataset of 
2010 MEPs’ survey records. In terms of external validity of 
this model, this study has no ambition of explaining how 
MEPs actually vote. Nevertheless, since voting behaviour 
is not observable when vote is not held under the roll-call 
procedure, alternative methods have to be defined. In this 
respect, my main findings are that, surprisingly, national af-
filiation plays a greater role than the one usually attributed 
to it, at least in terms of individual preferences. The EP’s 
functioning is evolving towards the classical Westminster 
model, however clear national elements still survive. 
Future research could apply this simple model to other 
previous surveys waves (2006, 2000, 19969), to evaluate 
possible changes in the identified pattern. Alternatively, 
worth studying would be the application of more sophis-
ticated statistical to analysis of variables I have created 
from the survey data, such as Poole and Rosenthal’s (1997, 
2005) spatial maps of legislative voting.
9 These data are already available, thanks to Simon Hix 
(surveys of 2010, 2006, 2000) and GESIS – Leibniz Institute for the 
Social Sciences (survey of 1996).
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